There’s a chart making the rounds that caused Tim Lee over at Understanding AI to rewrite his recent (excellent!) article about the impact of AI on jobs. MIT’s Erik Brynjolfsson and colleagues found1 that young workers in AI-exposed jobs2 have seen their employment drop by 13% since ChatGPT arrived. Meanwhile, their older colleagues in the same fields are doing just fine.

[…] the youngest workers saw dramatic job losses—but only if they worked in occupations (like accountants or computer programmers) that were highly exposed to AI. Young workers in less exposed occupations (like nurses or construction workers) saw normal employment growth over the same period.
From a tech industry focus, it’s a little hard to disentangle the impact of reduced hiring after layoffs 3 from the growth of AI, but likely both had an impact. AI coding agents are making it easier to complete the kind of introductory tasks that might have been left for junior engineers.
New grads don’t just do simple tasks though, they grow and develop tacit knowledge of their company industry, begging the question is whether this is permanent disruption or temporary dislocation as the skills need shifts. As Tim calls out:
It’s important not to read too much into this research. Workers between the ages of 22 and 25 are a small slice of the job market, and their employment has always been more volatile than for older workers. When I graduated with a computer science degree in 2002, the economy was just emerging from the recession that followed the dot-com bubble. It was a hard time for a young adult to get their first programming job, but most of my peers eventually found work in the field.
To give an analogy, there was a time when becoming a junior programmer meant learning how to write fast code as cycles were too important to waste. Now, writing particularly efficient code is largely the preserve of specialist, more senior people: some folks opt in to that route early because of their personal interests, but in general raw performance of code is not the blocking factor to building something valuable.
My sense is we are seeing the same thing in terms of general “program composition”: senior folks with experience on large, collaborative projects can benefit from LLM automation as they understand how to put in the right project guardrails and how to translate needs into technical direction. Junior people are still mostly trained how to write working code, and that need has become less pressing as LLMs have proved moderately competent at it.
Rodney Brooks, the robotics legend, made a point back in 2018 that stuck with me: it’s not automation that disrupts workers—it’s digitalization. In his article, Brooks wrote
Digitalization is replacing old methods of sharing information or the flow of control within a processes, with computer code, perhaps thousands of different programs running on hundreds or thousands of computers, that make that flow of information or control process amenable to new variations and rapid redefinition by loading new versions of code into the network of computers.
An example that Brooks uses is bridge toll takers. This directly happened on the Bay Bridge between San Francisco and Oakland, which used to employ toll takers in booths. Then FastTrak was added, allowing passing through without interacting with anyone, while still offering cash tolls for those without. Now, between that and direct mail to people via cameras watching license plates, the tollbooths are empty.
LLMs also digitalize. Task descriptions and project documentation, for example, have been stored in human language: digital, but not particularly accessible to automation. Much of the work of managing a large bug tracking system has been in adding metadata that is accessible to automation. LLMs digitalize language, imperfectly to be sure, but enough to expose new swathes of work to automation.
High Road/Low Road
How will companies respond? Thomas Kochan at MIT has been mapping this kind of choice for years, and describes the separation between what he called the high road and low road.
The language that was used to differentiate these two approaches quickly evolved to a comparison of “high road” and “low-road” business strategies and “high-performance work systems,” which viewed labor as an asset, versus “command and control” systems, which viewed labor as a cost like any other factor of production. A comparison of the business strategies of two household names, Walmart and Costco, illustrates the differences between low-road and high-road business strategies. Walmart has been extremely successful (when judged solely on the grounds of finances and shareholder value) by pursuing a business strategy best captured by its marketing tag line: “Every day low prices.” To achieve this strategy, it places top priority on minimizing and tightly controlling labor costs, discouraging long-term tenure of its “associates,” investing little in training and development, and avoiding unions at all costs. Costco’s business strategy places a higher value on product quality and customer service, and to achieve these objectives it pays higher wages, invests more in training its work force to understand and serve customer needs, and has longer tenure patterns (and thus lower turnover costs). As a result, Costco’s employees are more productive, stay with the firm longer, and have more discretion to use their time and knowledge to solve customer problems.
Tech companies have, in the most part, been high-road employers. Employees have been an asset, and in some cases the key asset of the company. The low road though is not simply driven by cost cutting, it’s about control. Having a more fungible, replaceable workforce gives executives more options. Having more specialized, skilled workers offers the options of more flexibility in how work is done, but shifts control to the workers and away from management.
We can see this play out in some of the post-pandemic cultural changes. There is a concept in work called deskilling, where work is atomized to improve efficiency: take something which was a skill and divide it up until it until the individual components becomes unskilled. Classic examples are in factory work, where a skilled person is replaced with an operator of a machine, or more often a series of operators of a series of machines4. This trades a higher up-front cost in terms of capital and procedure development for a lower labor cost, transferring both money but also power from workers to managers.
A recent article extended this concept to virtues, with the idea of “moral deskilling”. A virtue is a positive behavior, such as building responsibility or with high quality. Virtues tend to be individual qualities, things we recognize and reward in others: much of culture in a company is about inoculating virtues. That is inherently messy and the idea of systematizing virtue is appealing: move from a fuzzy, personal conception to a verifiable checklist or a rule that can be followed. This worked in a lot of cases, but it also enabled a form of deskilling:
Systematising virtue handed control to managers. Who, endlessly mistrusting these expert folk who were always trying to do things the expensive way, converted that mistrust into endless, endless paper work.
It was endless because it broke every little aspect of what had been virtue into tiny components. Fearful of losing control of any scrap of virtue, managers needed to relentless check on every little task.
If we want to see this play out in real-time we can look at the return-to-office mess in tech. A vibrant, collaborative office culture is a good thing, and it requires a compact. Employees would deal with the misery of a commute5 (particularly in the SF bay area), but in exchange they would participate in an environment where they could learn and teach, build camaraderie and so on.
When the idea of a return to office happened post-pandemic, people had found pleasure and benefit in not doing the commute. When they returned, they found the offices less vibrant, the workforce more distributed, and cost-driven reductions in space making the experience harder through shortages of meeting rooms or desks.
Compounded by a series of layoffs and a change in the prior relationship between company and employee, the in-office deal felt worse. Frustrated with the lack of the old compact, management exerted control through systems. They set required days and logged attendance through badge ins. Workers responded by treating the atomized requirements as mere requirements, not aspects of a culture: even a small percentage of folks coffee badging or trying to work from more convenient offices were visible in the empty desks, exacerbating tensions for workers “doing the right thing”.
Rather than analyze the problem and step back, management in many cases doubled down on systematizing: validating time at desk, logging badge out times or adding similar extra controls. This continued to take what had been a morally complex set of trade-offs and reduce it to a checklist. For many newer staff, that was the in-office experience.
This is the essence of the low road: prioritizing the systematized and legible over the messy, and complex, but more interesting, world of dealing with real people; prioritizing power and control over exploring new outcomes.
One way to view what’s happening is through the lens of debt, which is one of the angles in a recent position paper that frames the future of work as an AI Safety risk. Every time a company chooses to replace junior workers with LLMs rather than training them, they’re borrowing against the future. Matt Garman of AWS was pretty clear on his position:
“I was at a group, a leadership group and people were telling me they’re like we think that with AI we can replace all of our junior people in our company. I was like that’s the like one the dumbest thing I’ve ever heard […] They’re probably the least expensive employees you have. They’re the most leaned into your AI tools and like how’s that going to work when you go like 10 years in the future and you have no one that has built up or learned anything.”
But understanding something and acting on it are different things. Both the low road and high road can lead to a lot of success in business, but I do hope we can navigate this transition towards a place where the craft can be retained in software development. The question is whether enough companies will choose the messy, complex work of developing people over the appealing simplicity of trying to replace them.
- Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence — Stanford Digital Economy Lab ↩︎
- Like programming and accountancy, knowledge work fields that have a large amount of machine interaction ↩︎
- As well as pandemic-driven overhiring and the end of zero interest rates ↩︎
- Or now robots in entirely lights out factories for sufficiently high scale productions ↩︎
- Particularly in the SF bay area! ↩︎




